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Anyone who has traveled by air has most likely experienced long airport security lines.
Yet not much is known about its cause because few have considered if passengers have
created this problem for themselves. The present study attempts to fill this research gap
by suggesting that when passengers are not well-prepared for security screening, they
delay the process by making mistakes and not complying with procedures. This lack of
preparedness can be attributed to several shortcomings of security signposts. This study
proposes the use of a modified boarding pass as an alternative form of signage to help
passengers better prepare for security screening. In a recall evaluation of the items to
remove prior to security screening, the combination of the modified boarding pass and
security signposts led to greater recall than when either stimuli were used alone. In an
airport survey to gather public sentiment, three-quarters of the respondents saw value in
the idea of the modified boarding pass. Although the majority of the respondents were
receptive to it becoming an option for future travel, many also felt that the modified
boarding pass would be more useful than security signposts or announcements at
conveying helpful security screening information.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The purpose of airport security is to screen for and deter acts of terrorism, or
criminal activity at screening checkpoints so that civilian passengers may travel safely
(Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014). However, this purpose should be done in a manner where
passengers are not delayed, or miss their flights because they have been stuck at
screening checkpoints. Today, passengers spend a great deal of time waiting in long
security lines (Jet, 2018). This problem can be attributed to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) revamping the passenger screening process after its inception in
2001, following the terrorist attacks of September 11 (Pekoske, 2018). Ever since, the
TSA has tried to shorten these lines while not compromising on its already robust
security standards, but has unfortunately, not been able to do so (Halsey, 2016).
Faced with the problem of long security lines, the TSA has made heavy
investments into newer screening technology, redesigning tasks to maximize human
performance, or simply hiring thousands of additional TSA agents (Lastoe, 2019;
Transportation Security Administration, 2016; Vasel, 2016). However, there is a lack of
understanding and the de facto problem could be that passengers are simply not
well-prepared for security screening. Their lack of preparedness and screening
proficiency could have possibly led to consistently sub-optimal levels of passenger
throughput at screening checkpoints. As such, congestion and long security lines have
continued to exist at major U.S. airports (Marsh & Patterson, 2016).
To conceptualize the lack of preparedness and screening proficiency, the term
user failure is used. Few studies have investigated how passengers have hindered
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security screening, and even fewer have looked into ways to help passengers better
prepare for it. Accordingly, there is the important question of why passengers are often
unprepared for security screening, and how they can be better prepared in the future. The
objective of this study is to answer both questions by further investigating user failure,
and proposing a unique alternative security signage, in the form of a modified boarding
pass to help passengers better prepare for security screening.
Significance of the Study
As a relatively unexplored field in airport security, understanding and exploring
user failure may be significant in helping the TSA expedite security screening. To do so,
this study analyzes why many passengers are unfamiliar with screening procedures, and
evaluates a proposal that may help passengers better prepare for security screening. The
proposed modified boarding pass can be more easily accessible and visible to passengers.
This paper serves as a litmus test to investigate if the modified boarding pass can improve
passenger preparedness for security screening. Bearing any positive outcome, the
knowledge gained from this study could provide an actionable framework that gives
security screening a fresh impetus to expediting the screening process. Finally, the
concept of user failure introduced in this paper, will contribute to the existing literature on
airport security, and may serve as a pioneering effort toward expediting security
screening.
Statement of the Problem
Security screening can be an intricate and complex process for passengers.
Unfortunately, if passengers are not prepared for it, they are likely to inadvertently,
concede to error, which can lead to time-consuming stoppages at screening checkpoints.
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With more passengers expecting to transverse through United States (U.S.) airports in the
years to come (Rosen, 2017), maintaining security in its current form could become
increasingly difficult. Therefore, there is a need for security checkpoints to process
passengers at a quicker rate. Little is known about how passengers contribute to long
security lines, and hence, there has been a lack of solutions that involve passengers.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study is to investigate if there is a simpler and cost-effective
solution to expediting security screening and shortening long security lines. The proposed
modified boarding pass aims to help passengers better prepare for security screening so
that they make fewer time-consuming mistakes, and are better at complying with
screening guidelines. It is hoped that the modified boarding pass is a step toward
shortening passenger lines at security screening checkpoints.
Research Questions
There are two studies in this paper. Study 1 is a recall evaluation, and Study 2 is
an airport survey.
Study 1 Research question. The research question was to investigate if there
were any differences in the ability to recall 10 specific items that are to be removed prior
to security screening such as shoes, belts, and tablets (hereafter referred to as interference
items). The same 10 interference items were displayed on three types of stimuli in the
recall evaluation. The three types of stimuli are stated below and can be found in
Appendix B.
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1. Regular, non-modified boarding passes with two standing signposts
2. Modified boarding passes only
3. Modified boarding passes with two standing signposts.
Hypotheses
The researcher tested the null hypotheses for Study 1.
H01: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between participants given regular, non-modified boarding passes with two standing
signposts and participants given modified boarding passes only.
H02: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between participants given modified boarding passes with two standing signposts and
participants given regular, non-modified boarding passes with two standing signposts.
H03: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between participants given modified boarding passes with two standing signposts and
participants given modified boarding passes only.
Study 2 Research question. Study 2 involved a survey that was conducted at a
local airport to ascertain passenger opinion toward the idea of the modified boarding
pass. The research question was if passengers felt that the modified boarding pass would
be useful to them during security screening if it became an option at airports in the future.
Delimitations
The scope of the research pertaining to the recall evaluation was limited to
students from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) partly because it was not
possible to obtain the necessary permissions and authorizations needed to run this
experiment in an airport environment using regular passengers and security equipment.
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However, the use of ERAU students was deemed adequate as they were fully expected to
exhibit behaviors similar to regular passengers. As for the research pertaining to the
airport survey conducted for this paper, the passenger feedback gathered was considered
to be representative of the greater traveling population.
Limitations and Assumptions
The results of the recall evaluation can only be generalized across the students
from ERAU. Although effort was made to maximize mundane realism, the evaluation
was conducted in a simulated environment (classroom). Hence, the results may not
accurately reflect that of an airport environment. An evaluation in an airport
environment would likely improve mundane realism and produce more accurate results
and conclusions. For the airport survey, the results were taken from passengers that
traveled through Daytona International Airport (DAB). It was assumed that these
passengers would be representative of passengers traversing through other U.S. airports.
Definitions of Terms
Backtracking

Passengers having to go through the Walk-Through
Metal Detector (WTMD) more than once.

Decision criterion

Criteria or benchmark used to plan on a
sensory output

Dual-coding theory

Pictures are cognitively coded twice whereas words
are only coded once.

False alarm

Bags mistakenly flagged for a suspicious item that
turned out to be inconsequential.
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Hassle factor

Inconveniences and stresses of flying resulting in
people looking for other alternative modes of
transport.

Inattentional blindness

Being temporarily blinded to salient objects because
of engagement in other tasks

Low-prevalence target

A rare, infrequent target.

Mundane Realism

Extent to which an experiment is similar to its
intended real environment and the ability for the
results to be generalized to the real world

Picture superiority effect

Human cognitive inclination toward pictures over
texts

Receiver operator

Graph depicting the trade-off between

characteristic (ROC)

sensitivity and specificity

Selective attention

Mechanism that guides an individual’s attention

Signal detection theory

The theory of having to pick out and distinguish
relevant signals from background noise

Speed-accuracy trade-off

Inverse relationship between speed and accuracy

Subsequent search misses

The identification of a specific target

(SSM)

improves the ability to find a subsequent
similar target but at the same time reduces
the ability to search for dissimilar targets.
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User failure

The development of long security lines owing to
passengers being unprepared, unfamiliar and their
lack of proficiency at security screening.

Vigilance decrement

Performance lapses associated with sustained focus
and attention on a task

Voluntary attention

Ability of a stimulus to capture attention because it
is relevant to a desired behavioral goal

List of Acronyms
COA

College of Aviation

DAB

Daytona International Airport

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FBS

Full Body Scanner

HHMD

Hand-Held Metal Detector

ROC

Receiver Operator Curve

SDT

Signal Detection Theory

SSM

Subsequent Search Miss

TSA

Transportation Security Administration

WM

Working Memory
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
In airport security, user failure proposes that the end users —passengers— are
responsible for long security lines, instead of more conventional arguments such as poor
human performance, not enough security personnel, or older, rudimentary screening
technology. As such, user failure has not been thoroughly investigated in the literature
pertaining to airport security. Although this study proposes that understanding user failure
can help expedite security screening, it is important to first understand the passengers’ role
in user failure.
Lack of Screening Proficiency and Familiarity
Unfamiliarity with screening procedures may have led to passengers walking
through metal detectors without realizing they had to remove their belts and watches,
while others unknowingly try to carry filled water bottles through screening checkpoints.
With presumably little or fractional knowledge of screening procedures, passengers can be
susceptible to mistakes and non-compliance. These individuals may have to repeat certain
aspects of the screening process and hence, fewer passengers can be screened at any one
time. Unfortunately, the screening process is disrupted, and result in bottlenecks at
security checkpoints (de Barros & Tomber, 2007).
To further complicate matters, international passengers are possibly, less likely to
be experienced or adept at the screening procedures of a foreign country. At times, they
may inadvertently not comply with screening guidelines. Screening procedures can also
occasionally differ between U.S. domestic airports. It is conceivable that the average
passenger takes a longer time to successfully clear security screening as the passenger
takes time to adjust and acquaints to unfamiliar and different screening guidelines. To
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further illustrate how passengers can adversely affect the screening process, user failure
will be addressed in greater detail.
Illustration of user failure. In the U.S., most passengers —excluding TSA
pre-check and passengers above 75 years old— are required to remove specific items from
their pockets and carry-on bags such as shoes, light jackets, mobile phones, and tablets
(Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2009). These items are to be placed onto trays at the
screening carousel during x-ray screening because they can interfere with security
screening (Transportation Security Administration, 2019). These items are referred to as
interference items. Because the classification of interference items can vary between
countries and domestic airports, passengers unfamiliar with U.S. screening guidelines may
not satisfactorily comply with the removal of all pertinent interference items. When this
confusion occurs, passengers and their carry-on bags will most likely be flagged by
security personnel or set off alarms while walking through metal detectors or, body and
x-ray scanners. Flagged passengers are then called over to assist in the resolution of the
alarm while the rest of the line comes to a halt, and passenger processing is temporarily
suspended (de Barros & Tomber, 2007).
The alarm resolution process consists of a combination of actions ranging from
wand searches by a Hand-Held Metal Detector (HHMD), pat-downs, manual inspection
of carry-on bags, and repeated metal detector or body scanner walk-throughs
(Pendergraft, Robertson, & Shrader, 2004; van Boekhold, Faghri, & Li, 2014). If
passenger processing at the screening checkpoint is frequently interrupted by raised
alarms, a start-stop sequence will be initiated, and passenger lines will possibly move
even slower while getting longer.
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Evolution of TSA Screening Procedures
Since its inception, the TSA has introduced a medley of eclectic yet wide-ranging
screening procedures as seen in Figure 1. Largely influenced by previous attacks and
attempts on civil aviation, TSA screening procedures have been modified to withstand
future attempts and potential reoccurrences (Peterson, 2016). The evolution of the TSA’s
screening procedure is summarized in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Timeline of TSA screening procedures.

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, hijacking by al-Qaeda terrorists, box-cutters
were banned. Not long after, Richard Reid “The Shoe-Bomber,” attempted to sneak and
detonate a bomb in his shoe (Ehrett, 2011). Consequently, passengers remove their shoes
for x-ray screening with the exception of some individuals such as those enrolled in TSA
pre-check or above 75 years old (Blalock, Kadiyali, & Simon, 2007). In 2006, a plot to
blow up an aircraft using liquid explosives stored in carry-on bags was uncovered.
Inevitably, the liquid 3-1-1 rule was commissioned; 3-ounce (100ml) container limit
inside 1-quart clear, plastic zip-lock, 1 per passenger (Deno, Diaz, Lliguicota, Norman, &
González, 2014; Ehrett, 2011).
In 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, “The Underwear Bomber,” boarded an
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aircraft with plastic explosives strapped to his underwear. Although it failed to detonate, it
led to the introduction of the Full Body Scanner (FBS), where passengers now remove
outer-layer clothing, belts, shoes, jewelry, and empty their pockets before proceeding to
have a full-body image taken by the FBS to determine if they have carried any concealed
weapons or explosives (Harawa, 2013; Stewart & Mueller, 2011). More recently,
passengers are required to remove electronic devices larger than a cell phone (e.g., tablets
and e-readers) from their carry-on, and undergo x-ray screening in the same manner that
laptops currently do to reduce the clutter found in carry-on bags (Campbell, 2017).
Problem with TSA screening procedures. Introduced in direct response to
previous threats or foiled attempts, TSA screening procedures were often modified.
However, doing so also means that few passengers are likely to be able to keep abreast of
all the most current screening procedures. Because of this reason, passengers in general,
are probably less proficient at screening and naturally, more likely to not comply. When
fewer passengers are screened at any one-time, long and slow-moving security lines are
likely to emerge. Passengers are likely to be delayed, miss their connections, or at the very
least, have to rush to their gates (Hattenschwiler et al., 2015; Lazar Babu, Batta, & Lin,
2006).
User Failure Creates More Stoppages and Secondary Searches
For regular scheduled flights, one in three passengers were found to have
backtracked through metal detectors a second time, while every seventh to ninth passenger
had their carry-on bags searched (Kirschenbaum, 2013). Searching carry-on bags can be
problematic and time-consuming as screeners would have to stop the conveyor belt,
identify the owner of the bag, and request for the passenger to proceed for further
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inspection by another security officer. Here, considerable time and resources may be spent
identifying suspicious items and possibly removing them from the bag (van Boekhold,
Faghri, & Li, 2014). There are also times where carry-on bags may raise alarms that turn
out to be harmless and inconsequential. This outcome often happens because screeners
spot interference items that have to be removed before the bag can be re-screened and
cleared (Sterchi & Schwaninger, 2015). Otherwise known as a false alarm, such instances
can be time-consuming and can be particularly troublesome if security lines are already
long (Department of Homeland Security, 2019).
The primary purpose of security screening should be to detect and remove items of
unlawful interference (e.g., weapons and explosives), not to be overly stretched by the
detection of benign interference items that should have been removed prior to security
screening. Fewer interference items will not be subjected to additional screening if
passengers took more responsibility.
Diminishing Passenger Tolerance
Security in itself is a trade-off and there is no perfect scenario where convenience
meets extraordinary security or vice versa (Eldridge, 2018). When the TSA began
securing airports in 2001, passengers accepted this trade-off and were willing to get to
airports increasingly earlier, stand in long lines, and undergo extra security (Frederickson
& LaPorte, 2002). At that time, it would have been hard to predict that long security lines
would continue to this day. Passenger tolerance has slowly diminished as the memory of
September 11 and previous terrorist attacks fade (Martin, 2011). Although threats are not
as noticeably imminent as before, security lines seem to have gotten longer. Today,
passengers are advised to arrive at most airports at least 3 hours before international
flights, and no later than 2 hours for domestic ones, to have enough time for airport
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security (O’Connor, 2018).
The hassle factor. In airport security literature, a far-reaching effect of the
inconveniences associated with airport security is known as the hassle factor, where
growing masses choose not to fly and turn to other modes of transportation (Ghobrial &
Irvin, 2004; Ito & Lee, 2005; Seidenstat, 2004). The hassle factor became prominent
during the TSA’s infancy when long security lines started to emerge. Today there is
evidence to suggest that the hassle factor continues to persist. For example, a recent 2016
survey found that during public holidays, about a fifth of respondents would rather travel
by another mode of transport, or not travel at all than to be stuck in airport security (U.S
Travel Association, 2016). The consequences of many travelers choosing not to fly or
turning to other modes of transport can be costly.
During the 2016 summer period alone, the hassle factor was responsible for an
approximate loss of $4.3 billion in potential travel spending (U.S Travel Association,
2016). There is also a rather new dimension of the hassle factor in the form of
autonomous, driverless vehicles. Rice and Winter (2018) note that unlike air travel,
driverless vehicles are not subjected to the same stresses and time spent waiting in airport
security, or the restrictions on essentials such as traveling liquids.
The TSA’s unsustainable security spending. In efforts to approach 100%
security, the TSA has spent a considerable amount to mitigate long security lines, and
to maintain airport security in its current form. For example, in 2016, the TSA
requested $34 million from Congress to employ additional TSA officers and overtime
workers, in order to alleviate congestion at various TSA checkpoints around the
country (Jansen, 2016). At this rate of spending to contain congestion, security costs
are likely to increase. In 2002, the funding to the TSA was only about $2.3 billion,
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(Department of Transportation, 2002). However, over the last 5 years, the funding
made available to the TSA was at an estimated $7 billion per year (GAO, 2017), a
three-fold increase to the funding in 2002. It is worth noting that in 2002, the TSA was
still securing airports around the nation whereas in the last 5 years, much of the TSA’s
security infrastructure should have already been well-established and would only
require regular maintenance.
Additionally, the TSA was advised to explore alternatives to maintain the greatest
risk mitigation value for every dollar spent, stressing the need for the Administration to be
fiscally prudent (GAO, 2017). Every dollar spent on securing airports is a dollar that
cannot be spent on securing other infrastructure (e.g., subways or bus stations). It would
certainly be in the country’s best interest to have security funds more equally distributed
across other critical infrastructure.
Previous Studies Lack Understanding of User Failure
Focusing on the end user —the passenger— user failure differs with most
research in the relevant literature on how to expedite the security screening process. A
large focus has been on screening technology, screening procedures and screeners
themselves, as evident in the following literature review.
Mediocre screener performance. Harris (2002) suggests that the disparity
between expected (desired) and actual screener performance can be attributed to the fact
that humans are simply not well suited to perform what is asked of screeners: visually
searching for a target item among an array of heterogeneous, distractor items (Wolfe,
Brunelli, Rubinstein & Horowitz, 2013). When complexities such as bag density, object
superimposition, and orientation are thrown into the mix, a screener’s detection ability and
speed can be further diminished (Hofer & Schwaninger, 2005; Wetter, 2013). Many other
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factors such as overloading and underloading screeners, task repetition, attention span, and
monotony, can increase the number of screener errors and mistakes (Kraemer, Carayon, &
Sanquist, 2009). These reasons highlight how susceptible screeners are to circumstances
and factors beyond their control. One such factor that screeners cannot control is their
ability to remain vigilant and focused on x-ray monitor displays over extended periods of
time, otherwise known as vigilance decrement (Grier et al., 2003).
Vigilance decrement. A screener’s job requires sustained attention that surpasses
the average human capacity. Even more challenging, is the ability to maintain the required
level of sustained attention, operational readiness, and responsiveness to pick out specific,
rare-occurring targets such as explosives (Hubal, Mitroff, Cain, Scott, & DeWitt, 2010).
These rare occurring targets can be separated by long intervals, which can cause a
screener’s supervisory ability to lose sensitivity, making the screener naturally less
focused (Grier et al., 2003). When vigilance decrement occurs, screeners are more prone
to errors, and are more likely to screen passengers at a slower rate than before.
It only takes 10 to 15 minutes of task engagement to substantially degrade the
ability to maintain vigilance (Pavlas, Rosen, Fiore, & Salas, 2008). European regulations
have been put in place to combat vigilance decrement by prohibiting its airport screeners
from spending more than 20 continuous minutes reviewing x-ray images (Chavaillaz et al.,
2019). Although implementing mandatory scheduled breaks may enable screeners to
better focus on their tasks, it may not adequately alleviate the problem of long security
lines. Nonetheless, vigilance decrement should be taken seriously, considering the central
role it plays in human-machine operations and its ensuing success.
Leaving laptops in carry-on bags. Removing large electronic devices such as
laptops from carry-on bags to be screened separately, can be seen as an inconvenience to
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most. This procedure takes time and can slow down the screening process. Mendes,
Schwaninger, Strebel and Michel (2012) investigated the possibility of leaving laptops in
carry-on bags during screening. Because laptops are inherently dense, they interfere with
the penetration of x-ray beams, and make it difficult for screeners to see items in front or
behind the laptops. It would take screeners a longer time to inspect other carry-on items
when laptops are left inside. Subsequently, Mendes et al. concluded that removing large
electronic devices such as laptops from carry-on bags remained appropriate and necessary,
despite its unfavorable impact on screening throughput. Although the idea of leaving large
electronic devices in carry-on bags could simplify and expedite the screening process, this
example illustrates that there are certain challenges with modifying current screening
procedures without compromising security.
Expanding risk-based, trusted traveler programs. Wong and Brooks (2015)
examined the possibility of revamping the one-size-fits-all approach that current security
standards dictate because it is not feasible to subject most passengers to the same high
standards of security. Pointing to the unfavorable effects that current security standards
have had on security lines, Wong and Brooks proposed for the expansion of risk-based
programs (also known as trusted traveler programs) such as TSA PreCheck, where
passenger risk assessment is conducted using personal information such as demographics,
historical background, and previous flight profiles.
With TSA PreCheck, eligible passengers are exempted from removing several
interference items such as shoes, belts, even laptops, and liquids. Using a separate,
expedited security line, TSA PreCheck allows more passengers to be screened at one time,
eliminating the need for qualified passengers to undergo the same scrutiny as the rest of
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the flying public (Nie et al., 2009). Introduced in 2011, TSA PreCheck has helped
alleviate congestion at security checkpoints. However, security lines still remain long,
implying that TSA PreCheck alone has probably not been enough to fix the problem.
Wong and Brooks advocated the need to expand or introduce more similar risk-based
programs to truly make an impactful difference. Examples of similar programs that
already exist include Global Entry and NEXUS (Lowe, 2016).
Simpler screening procedures. According to de Barros and Tomber (2007), post
September 11 screening throughput had drastically reduced due to the new and relatively
complex security measures. de Barros and Tomber tested several ideas that would
increase screening throughput using a simulation model of Seattle-Tacoma (Sea-Tac)
International Airport. The most effectively tested idea was to simply reduce the number of
carry-on items, by one item. Taking motivation from the simplicity of the idea, Sea-Tac
began pursuing other simple yet practical ideas. One example was distributing large
plastic bags for passengers to store and gather carry-on items to expedite the pre-screening
divesting and post-screening gathering process. The study demonstrated that simpler,
cost-effective measures could be undertaken to improve screening throughput and
efficiency. The proposed idea enclosed in the present study takes motivation from the
study by de Barros and Tomber in devising simple yet creative solutions to solve
seemingly challenging, and complicated problems.
Queuing theory and screening throughput. Marin, Drury, Batta and Lin (2007)
analyzed a less explored aspect of queuing theory: examining servers (screeners). Marin et
al. investigated the prediction by Parkinson’s Law where screeners would speed up their
processing rate when confronted with longer security lines. This prediction had important
implications because if it were true, it meant that a speed-accuracy trade-off was present.
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In airport security, this trade-off involves the decision between correctly identifying
prohibited items and that of quicker passenger processing. In favor of quicker passenger
processing, screeners would focus more on speed and less so on accuracy. Although more
passengers can be screened, it comes at the cost of more mistakes as less time is taken by
the screener to make correct, accurate screening decisions (Knol, Sharpanskykh, &
Janssen, 2019).
The speed-accuracy trade-off suggests that when security lines are long, screeners
are more likely to pass a bag through as acceptable, even though they would have flagged
the same bag if the line was not as long (Biggs, Cain, Clark, Darling, & Mitroff, 2013).
Although the trade-off may help shorten security lines, the compromise between the ability
to quickly screen passengers and that of screening them thoroughly and assiduously, is not
in the best interest of safety. Consideration should be given to the consequences of
less-thorough screening where more missed detections are tolerated in favor of quicker
processing (Wetter, 2013). Marin et al. (2007) found that only one out of four tested item
types experienced the speed-up effect predicted by Parkinson’s Law. Screeners ensured
that each item was thoroughly screened, fully aware that doing so would do little to
alleviate the already long security lines and waiting times. The speed-up effect predicted
by Parkinson’s Law was not prominent enough and illustrated that Parkinson’s Law is
unlikely to help shorten airport security lines.
Greater Provision of Security Guidelines
Contrary to most of the literature review, van Boekhold, Faghri and Li (2014)
recommends better educating the traveling public on how to prepare for security screening.
van Boekhold et al. acknowledges the role of passengers in creating long security lines
owing to their unfamiliarity with screening procedures. This notion stems from the
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statistic that although screening guidelines can be found on internet sources such as airline
websites, only 24.6% of travelers use it, and an even lower 9.1% of travelers use the TSA
website to seek out screening information. The statistic suggests that although screening
information can be conveniently found over the internet, utilization rates have been
poor, and that perhaps more can be done to improve the utilization of such pertinent
screening information.
One of the ways suggested by van Boekhold et al. (2014) to better educate the
traveling public was to advocate for more effective use of security signage. van Boekhold
et al. postulated that when passengers were better prepared for screening, they were less
likely to be flagged by security personnel for non-compliance. Passengers more informed
and familiar with screening procedures require less time to clear security, and could help
expedite screening and shorten passenger lines.
Informed vs uninformed passengers. There are two types of passengers:
informed and uninformed passengers. Informed passengers are well-versed with
screening guidelines, and spend an average of 20-30 seconds to successfully clear
security (Kirschenbaum, 2013). Uninformed passengers are more likely to not comply
with screening guidelines albeit mostly unintentionally, and spend an average of 1-2
minutes to successfully clear security. Generally, informed passengers tend to, and are
presumed to be frequent fliers, whereas uninformed passengers are usually non-frequent
fliers and are more likely, international passengers. The difference in the time taken to
successfully clear security by the two types of passengers is significant, because it
supports the user failure sentiment that a lack of screening proficiency results in extra time
needed to undergo security screening.
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How User Failure Undermines Screener Performance
When user failure occurs, screeners encounter more interference items such as
laptops and liquids that are left in carry-on bags instead of more dangerous, urgent threats
such as weapons and explosives (Wolfe et al., 2013). More interference items can create
an element of uncertainty that can compromise screener performance. Screeners already
deal with an enormous amount of uncertainty from a wide array of dangerous, prohibited
items that can pass through their checkpoint at any given time or day (Biggs & Mitroff,
2015). As such, a screener’s job may be unnecessarily more challenging. It would be
easier if the screener only had to focus on picking out dangerous and prohibited items,
instead of combing for more benign interference items.
Mental representations. Before a screener identifies a target (prohibited or
interference item), mental representations of the target must be formed beforehand,
otherwise the screener does not know what he is looking out for. It is never that
straightforward because screeners have to often simultaneously search for several
targets (in carry-on bags) instead of just one (Menneer, Barrett, Phillips, Donnelly, &
Cave, 2007). Because user failure results in more interference items being left in carry-on
bags, screeners have to create even more mental representations to identify these targets.
Given the pressure of achieving high passenger turnover, screeners are more likely to
make more rash and careless decisions (Turcsany, Mouton, & Breckon, 2013).
User failure can lead to increased screener workload and pressure that can
adversely affect their performance. In fact, evidence suggests that screeners are already
performing at sub-optimal levels. In 2015, Homeland Security undercover agents were
able to smuggle fake firearms and explosives through TSA screening checkpoints 67 out
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of 70 tests (Lowe, 2016). This statistic demonstrates the effect of user failure on screener
performance. More importantly, it underlines the need for countermeasures to protect
screeners from the effects of user failure, giving them the best opportunity to do their job
capably and without unnecessary complications (Graves et al., 2011; Michel,
Hattenschwiler, Kuhn, Strebel, & Schwaninger, 2014).
Subsequent Search Misses (SSM). In professions such as radiology where
multiple-target visual searches are central to the task at hand, the art of searching for one
target among a set of distractors can result in the phenomenon known as Subsequent
Search Miss (SSM). SSM is a type of error where the identification of one target leads to
a higher likelihood of missing a second, subsequent target (Biggs, Adamo, Dowd, &
Mitroff, 2015). This error occurs partly because the initially identified target is stored in
the screener’s working memory (WM) and hence, reduces the already limited amount of
cognitive resources available to find another subsequent target (Cain, Biggs, Darling, &
Mitroff, 2014). Biggs et al. (2015) proposes that a form of bias is developed where
screeners are likely to find a subsequent target only if it is similar to the initial target
found. This statement implies that screeners are less likely to find a second target if it is
inconsistent with the first target found (Biggs & Mitroff, 2015).
SSM is undesirable because it suggests that a subsequent, dissimilar target is
likely to be missed by screeners regardless if it is a dangerous or harmless target.
User failure plays an important role in prompting SSM. For example, if a passenger
packs a weapon in his bag and does not remove interference items (e.g., laptops or
liquid containers), SSM suggests that if a screener finds the laptop or liquid container
first, it is possible he will miss the weapon. Here, the individual escapes detection, and
is able to pass through the checkpoint with the dangerous item (Biggs & Mitroff, 2015).
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User Failure and Low Prevalence Targets
Prohibited items such as weapons and explosives are typical low prevalence
targets. Such items are less conspicuous and can be difficult to detect during security
screening. Prohibited items are often camouflaged among clothing or other bag contents.
The prevalence of these items can be further reduced when distractors (i.e., interference
items) are present (Wolfe et al., 2007). The more items there are in carry-on bags, the
more disorganized and clustered the bag will be. User failure is one way that can increase
the number of interference items in carry-on bags.
Reduced prevalence and increased missed targets. Because user failure
can increase the number of interference items present in carry-on bags, the prevalence of
dangerous and prohibited items is also reduced, and this effect can make them harder to
find. In fact, Wolfe, Horowitz and Kenner (2005) captured the effect of reduced target
prevalence on the ability to identify target items as illustrated in Table 1. They found that
when target prevalence was lowered, participants were increasingly unable to identify and
pick out the target items, also known as error rate in the study. In Table 1, there is an
inverse relationship between target prevalence and error rate, where lower prevalence
correlated with a higher error rate and vice versa. When more interference items were
present, participants were less likely to identify target items.
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Table 1
Correlation Between Target Prevalence and Error Rate
Target Prevalence

Error Rate (participant failing to identify the
target)

50%
7%
10%
16%
1%
30%
Note. Inverse relationship between target prevalence and error rate. Adapted from Rare
items often missed in visual searches, by Wolfe, J. M., Horowitz, T. S., & Kenner, N. M.,
2005, Cognitive psychology, 435(7041), 439-440. Copyright 2005 by Nature.

Effect of missed target item on subsequent targets. When screeners fail to
identify prohibited items, they can become less likely to flag subsequent prohibited items
because their decision criterion has shifted to a more conservative stance, (Wolfe et al.,
2007) where screeners prematurely abandon their searches quicker than before. More
specifically, because there may be little justification to search as thoroughly for a target or
prohibited item that has seemed unlikely to exist by virtue of numerous, previous
inconsequential searches (Kunar, Rich, & Wolfe, 2010; Schwark, MacDonald, Sandry,
& Dolgov, 2013; Wolfe, et al., 2005; Wolfe et al., 2007). A conservative stance can also
result in fewer false alarms and secondary searches which can be beneficial to screening
throughput as there are fewer interruptions. Fewer false alarms also mean that it is more
likely that missed targets and prohibited items can pass through security checkpoints
(Green & Swets, 1966; Schwark, Sandry, & Dolgov, 2013; Van Wert, Horowitz, & Wolfe,
2009; Wolfe et al., 2007).
Screeners may prematurely end their searches quicker than before because they
deem prohibited items to be absent. Screeners may have failed to detect prohibited items
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due to reduced target prevalence rather than because the items were indeed absent.
Minimizing user failure might prevent prohibited items from being unnecessarily harder to
find, and more importantly, prevent screeners from missing subsequent prohibited items.
User Failure and Signal Detection Theory (SDT)
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is a particularly prominent aspect of airport
security screening. In security screening, SDT suggests that screeners have to evaluate
and make judgment calls to accurately detect relevant signals (McGuinness, 2004), while
discounting irrelevant distractions or background noise. Distractions or background noise
are non-signal events that do not require responses from screeners such as further
inspection, removal, or confiscation of an item. A screener’s judgment call can result in
one of four possible outcomes as summarized in Table 2.
Benefits of fewer total signals. Signals relevant to screeners, can originate from
both prohibited and interference items. However, signals from prohibited items can be
considered more crucial and time-sensitive simply because the consequences of not
detecting such signals can be far more severe. The focus should be on reducing signals
from interference items by minimizing the number of interference items mistakenly left in
carry-on bags. With fewer total signals, screeners can focus on more crucial signals from
prohibited items. Furthermore, less time can be spent on re-screening, secondary searches
and manual inspections.
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Table 2
Signal Detection Theory Four Possible Outcomes
Target Flagged

Target Not Flagged

Target Present

True positive
(Correct detection)

False negative
(Missed detection/target)

Target Absent

False positive
(False detection/alarm)

True negative
(Correct rejection)

Four outcomes of SDT. The four possible outcomes of SDT are summarized in
Table 2 (Bruno & Abrahão, 2012; Lynn & Barrett, 2014). Generally, false positives and
false negatives are undesirable because they create additional stoppages and may result in
dangerous, prohibited items passing through security. Instead, the goal should be more
true positives and true negatives where dangerous, prohibited items are caught in time and
unnecessary stoppages are minimized (Lynn & Barrett, 2014; Nevin, 1969).
Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve is imperative
to SDT because it summarizes the four possible outcomes in a graph (Yonelinas & Parks,
2007). The ROC curve is a graphical representation of the trade-off between the measures
of sensitivity and specificity (Martínez-Camblor, Bayón, & Pérez-Fernández, 2016,
O'Mahony & Hautus, 2008). Figure 2 is an example of the ROC curve.
Sensitivity and specificity. In the medical field, sensitivity is the ability to correctly
detect a disease when it is in fact present otherwise known as true positive. Specificity is
the ability to correctly determine that a disease is not present when it is in fact absent, also
known as true negative (Parikh et al., 2008; van Stralen et al., 2009). In security
screening, sensitivity is accurately flagging a bag that contains a prohibited or interference
item (true positive), whereas specificity is accurately and correctly allowing a bag that
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does not contain a prohibited or interference item, to pass through without further
inspection (true negative).
Optimal balance. Sensitivity and specificity possess an inverse relationship where
an increase in either measure’s value will see the corresponding measure value decrease.
As such, the aim is to find an optimal balance between both measures by using the ROC
curve to make a decision between a higher level of either sensitivity or specificity (Junge
& Dettori, 2018; Kumar & Indrayan, 2011; Reitsma et al., 2005). Balancing sensitivity
and specificity is often not straightforward. In an ideal scenario, high specificity entails
that a negative result of “the target is not present” is truly negative, while high sensitivity
entails that a positive result of “the target is present” is truly positive. This outcome rarely
happens in real life as a negative result is typically accompanied by false negatives and a
positive result is accompanied by false positives as denoted by the shaded areas in Figure
3, akin to a form of discrepancy (Junge & Dettori, 2018).
When specificity is higher, false negatives are more likely to be present, and when
sensitivity is higher, false positives are also more likely to be present. A higher value of
either specificity or sensitivity carries the consequences of either false negatives or false
positives. It is important to find an optimal balance between sensitivity and specificity,
and one where such discrepancies are minimized. In Figure 2, point C is an example of
this optimal balance as denoted by the red lines where the results are fairly accurate, and
void of errors as seen from the sensitivity score of 90 and specificity score of 10 that
equals to a 100. In comparison, there is an obvious presence of errors in points A, B, D
and E where the values of sensitivity and specificity do not add up to 100. Although point
C is an example of a perfect balancing between specificity and sensitivity, it can be rare in
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real life scenarios.
Trade-off. An optimal balance between sensitivity and specificity requires a
trade-off that can be made using the ROC curve. Consideration must be given to the
consequences of accepting either more false negatives or false positives. In Figure 3, a
cut-off value is used to make the trade-off where a lower cut-off value (leaning more
toward the left) entails accepting more false negatives while at the same time, accepting
fewer true negatives and vice versa (Hoo, Candlish, & Teare, 2017).
Implication on airport operations. If user failure is known to be prevalent,
airports should conduct a risk-benefit analysis to determine an acceptable cut-off level to
balance specificity and sensitivity. If an airport wishes to speed up security lines and
congestion caused by user failure, it could increase specificity and apply a higher cut-off
value (leaning more to the right in Figure 3) where fewer false positives are picked up.
This option may involve increasing the threshold of security equipment such as the
WTMD (Knol, Sharpanskykh, & Janssen, 2019). By increasing specificity, sensitivity is
lowered, meaning that fewer alarms are raised (including false alarms). The reduction of
the number of stoppages and secondary searches should help expedite security screening.
However, the airport would also be accepting the risk of greater false negatives
where there is a higher likelihood of prohibited items escaping detection. Although this
example utilizes SDT and the ROC curve to illustrate how an airport can shorten security
lines —adjusting its screening standards and accepting the ensuing trade-off— this paper
will investigate if there is another way to shorten security lines using another form of
security signage.
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Figure 2. ROC curve. Note. An optimal balance has to be found between sensitivity and
specificity. Figure 2 shows five cut-off points: A, B, C, D, and E. The most optimal
trade-off is seen at point C where there is a relatively high rate of true positives that is
accompanied by relatively low rates of false positives. Adapted from “ROC solid:
Receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves as a foundation for better diagnostic tests”
by Junge, M. R. J., & Dettori, J. R., 2018, Global Spine Journal, 8, p. 427. Copyright 2018
by SAGE.

Figure 3. Cut-off value and the four-possible outcomes. Note. Lower cut-off value
results in fewer false negatives, higher cut-off value results in fewer false positives.
Adapted from “ROC solid: Receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves as a
foundation for better diagnostic tests” by Junge, M. R. J., & Dettori, J. R., 2018,
Global Spine Journal, 8, p. 426. Copyright 2018 by SAGE.
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Minimizing User Failure Through More Effective Security Signage
In an aircraft emergency, passengers who pay attention to crew safety briefings,
watch the safety videos, or read the safety briefing cards, are more likely to survive
(Chittaro, 2017; Lee, Wang, Hsu, & Jan, 2018). These passengers are better prepared for
an emergency and are less likely to do things that hinder an evacuation such as climbing
over seats, or removing bags from overhead bins (Tehrani & Molesworth, 2015).
For security screening, passengers that are familiar with security guidelines tend to be
better prepared for security screening. In both aircraft emergencies and security screening,
passenger preparation is key to procedural adherence.
Considering that informed passengers take 20-30 seconds to undergo security
screening, and uninformed passengers required an average of 1-2 minutes (Kirschenbaum,
2013), it is fairly obvious that a more informed passenger who is well-versed with
screening guidelines should contribute to faster moving lines. The extent to which
passengers are well-versed and prepared for security screening would largely depend on
the saliency of security signage. The saliency of the TSA’s most visible form of signage
—standing signposts— will be examined.
TSA security signposts (hereafter referred to as TSA signposts) are usually found
near screening checkpoints as seen in Figure 4. However, there may be several
shortcomings with TSA signposts that may explain why passengers continue to lack
screening proficiency.
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Figure 4. Example of TSA signposts being obstructed.

Figure 5. Example of small font and wording of a TSA signpost.
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Figure 6. Example of difficulty in reading the contents of a TSA signpost

Short glances. Signposts can be easily and often obstructed by the movement of
passengers and their bags, unintentionally blocking another passenger’s line of sight
(denoted with red circles in Figure 4). TSA signposts and their contents may not be
clearly visible to passengers, particularly to those standing further away. Even when a
passenger gets within viewing distance of a TSA signpost, the hurried and chaotic
movement of people in the line may result in mere glances at best, or a complete failure to
notice the signpost at worst. If a passenger finds that it is has become too challenging to
read these signposts, he may choose to disregard it.
Viewing from a distance. Figure 5 illustrates the font size used in a regular TSA
signpost. At times, a fair amount of screening information (sometimes not pertinent to the
majority) is printed onto a single signpost. Doing so often shrinks the content’s font and
makes it necessary for passengers to physically get up close to read its contents. To
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further illustrate, Figure 6 depicts the difficulty in reading the signpost from a distance and
how passengers would have to leave their spot in the security line to physically approach
the signpost to view it up close. Stepping aside and leaving one’s spot (including personal
belongings) in a long security line to read a signpost may not be desirable especially when
traveling alone. Therefore, passengers are more likely to enter screening checkpoints with
little understanding of screening procedures. To further understand why passengers do not
fully utilize or benefit from TSA signposts, the concepts of voluntary attention,
inattentional blindness, and selective attention are introduced.
Voluntary attention. Voluntary attention suggests that when a stimulus
relevant to a desired goal is employed, the stimulus is able to better capture and draw the
attention of its intended respondent (Huang et al., 2015). TSA signposts should in fact, be
able to better capture the attention of passengers standing in security lines as it provides
information to help passengers clear screening quickly and without incident. The desired
effects of voluntary attention may not be as prominent as expected because of inattentional
blindness and selective attention.
Inattentional blindness. When fixated on a demanding task, passengers may not
see clearly visible objects that would have otherwise not have been missed (Beanland &
Pammer, 2012). When standing in security lines, passengers may find themselves being
hurried while engaged in tasks such as preparing identification, moving along the line with
children, or having to do so with bags in one or both hands. Here, these tasks can quickly
become demanding and frantic. Passengers may be temporarily narrow focused on the
task at hand, blinding them from salient objects such as TSA signposts (Drew, Võ, &
Wolfe, 2013). This example demonstrates how inattentional blindness can inadvertently
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offset the desired effects of voluntary attention, leaving passengers no more prepared for
screening than before being exposed to security signage.
Selective attention. Selective attention is the mechanism that determines where an
individual directs his attention and how he selects the information most relevant to his
current state (Giesbrecht, Sy, Bundesen, & Kyllingsbaek, 2014). Selective attention can
have an adverse impact on voluntary attention, particularly when passengers are distracted
by multiple sources of information (stimuli or salient objects) that actively compete to
capture passenger attention (Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013). This
effect is especially prominent in dynamic environments (e.g., security checkpoints) where
there is too much information originating from various stimuli and salient objects, making
it difficult for one particular source of information to successfully obtain selective
attention (Downing, 2000).
At security checkpoints, public conversations, speaker announcements, and
televised monitors that display flight information can be considered as sources of
information that compete with TSA signposts for selective attention. In this scenario, if a
passenger is engaged in a conversation, he or she is less likely to notice the TSA signposts
or the other sources of information since his attention has already been captured by the
other individual party to the conversation. For this reason, selective attention may explain
why passengers remain unprepared and unaware of screening procedures, despite the
recurring presence of security signage at screening checkpoints.
Low Utilization of the Internet
Although security screening guidelines are readily available over the internet, van
Boekhold et al. (2014) found that a relatively low percentage of passengers used the
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internet, particularly TSA or airline websites, to source out such information. In today’s
digital age, this statistic raises several concerns. The first points to how passengers have
not turned to the internet despite the convenience of being able to use their smartphones or
other electronic device to access screening information.
Second, passengers may erroneously believe that they are fully aware or familiar
with screening procedures. Passengers may not feel the need to gather more information
or verify if they are correct; a concern similar to passengers who are inattentive during
pre-flight safety briefings (Molesworth, Seneviratne, & Wilcock, 2019). Although these
passengers may feel that they possess high levels of screening proficiency, they may still
make the occasional screening mistake that contribute to delays at the checkpoint. It is
important that more is done to encourage passengers to review screening information
before they proceed to security checkpoints.
Justifying the Need for More Effective Signage
The present study suggests that passengers should be better prepared for security
screening. Figures 4, 5 and 6 illustrate how passengers are still relatively unprepared for
screening despite the presence of TSA signposts. The internet has not yielded the desired
utilization rates among passengers (van Boekhold et al., 2014).
Added visibility and accessibility. Screening instructions could be made more
immediately visible and easily accessible to passengers. The benefits of having more
convenient screening instructions can be explained by Wickens et al. (2004) who notes
that humans generally prefer to scan over shorter distances and favor minimal head
movements when choosing a source of information to focus on.
Using driving as an example, Wickens et al. (2004) explains that because it can be
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more inconvenient and physically demanding to check blind spots, fatigued drivers are less
likely to do so when changing lanes. This behavior is attributed to the additional effort
required to turn their heads and properly check their blind spots. In parallel, the same can
be said about TSA signposts because it can require a considerate amount of effort to find a
TSA signpost or get close enough to read it particularly when already exhausted from
pre-flight preparation (i.e., getting to the airport, check-in). Passengers may be less
inclined to look for TSA signposts in the same manner that fatigued drivers do not check
their blind spots.
More time for preparation. Screening information could also be provided to
passengers ahead of time, particularly before they reach security checkpoints. If
passengers have more time to review screening information before security screening, they
can be less likely to make mistakes as they are more familiar with what is expected of
them. On average, they should take a shorter time to be successfully screened. Because
TSA signposts are observed to be found near screening checkpoints, passengers may only
read these signposts when they enter screening checkpoints or when they are already
standing in line. Consequently, passengers are likely to be less prepared for screening.
Attentional refreshing. Lapses in memory are common and frequent occurrences
that happen because of the natural temporal decay of information from the WM, also
known as the short-term memory. Limited in its capacity, the WM temporarily stores
information until it is ready to be used (Wickens, Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004). In context,
non-frequent travelers (presumed to be a large majority of passengers) are more likely to
have lengthier breaks between their travel and for this reason, will probably forget certain
screening procedures. These passengers are more likely to make mistakes during
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screening.
However, this temporal decay of information can be counteracted if the stored
information and its memory traces are periodically reactivated in a process known as
attentional refreshing (Vergauwe & Langerock, 2017). Attentional refreshing not only
allows stored information to be prolonged but also strengthens the ability to activate it.
There is greater immediate recollection and retrieval of stored information (Camos et al.,
2018). A stimulus to display screening information could incorporate the use of
attentional refreshing to help passengers better remember screening guidelines.
Benefits of Using Symbols for Screening Instructions
Symbols could be used to represent screening information. The main benefit of
using symbols stem from the knowledge that symbols (including pictures) can be better
at drawing and attracting attention as compared to written or orally communicated
information. As word replacements, symbols are effective at stimulating better reading
and allows for a large amount of information to be replaced by a symbol or picture
(Brookshire, Scharff & Moses, 2002).
Lower English literacy and deaf passengers. The ability to transcend language
barriers help position the use of symbols and pictures as an effective means of providing
universal and easily understood information to most passengers, even if they are of lower
English literacy, or from an area where English is not the native language (Kripalani et al.,
2007; Shen, Xue, & Wang, 2018). Pictures and symbols can also be equally beneficial to
deaf passengers. With sign language as their primary mode of communication, it is
common that deaf passengers only command a third or fourth grade level of reading which
can make English instructions challenging. Symbols may be familiar and simple enough
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for these individuals to understand. The use of symbols may help mitigate the costly
training and hiring of full-time sign language interpreters that are occasionally deployed at
checkpoints to guide deaf passengers through screening procedures (Lancaster et al.,
2003).
Picture superiority effect. Katz et al. (2006) explained that humans possess a
cognitive inclination toward pictorial instructions rather than those only represented in
words, as explained by the phenomenon known as the “picture superiority effect”. More
specifically, it is the ability to better remember instructions illustrated as symbols or
pictures compared to when represented in words (Paivio, 1969; Paivio, & Csapo, 1973).
The preference for pictures over words has been frequently explained by the dual-coding
theory where, very simply put, words are coded once by the verbal-processing subsystem
whereas pictures are coded twice by the verbal and non-verbal processing subsystems.
This dual coding of pictures increases the magnitude and depth of the encoding, prompting
better recollection and recall (Crutcher & Beer, 2011; Curran, & Doyle, 2011; Lwin,
Morrin, & Krishna, 2010; Paivio, 1991; Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006).
Application in the medical field. In the medical field, low health literacy was
found to be a large factor for non-adherence to medical instructions. Non-adherence was
primarily due to misinterpretation and the inability to understand instruction labels. To
improve the understanding and adherence of prescription medication among lower health
literacy patients, Kripalani et al. (2007) experimented with pictorially illustrated
instructions. It was found that participants not only felt that pictorial instructions were
easy to comprehend but that participants were also receptive to its continued use. Given
the findings by Kripalani et al., it is hoped that the benefits and receptiveness toward
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pictorial instructions seen in the medical field may be transferred to security screening.
Maintaining symbol simplicity and familiarity. Shen, Xue and Wang (2018)
found that when more familiar and simple symbols were used, participants were better
able to recall the semantic information attached to each symbol, as compared to when
more unfamiliar, abstract symbols were used. This sentiment of avoiding abstract symbols
was further echoed by Houts,Doak, Doak and Loscalzo (2006). In fact, it was concluded
that pictograms or symbols used in safety briefing cards should also be simple and
unambiguous, designing it with the novice passenger in mind (Corbett, McLean, &
Cosper, 2008).
English Texts to Accompany Symbols
To help guide interpretation and minimize misunderstanding, English texts can be
used to accompany symbols. At times, accompanied English texts are important because
pictorial instructions may be too complex for some users, and can lead to misinterpretation
(Katz, Kripalani, & Weiss, 2006). Houts et al. (2006) demonstrated that when
accompanied written texts were used, there were signs of increased understanding and
adherence of instructions among participants. Houts et al. also advised that the
accompanying text should be as simple and concise as possible in order to be helpful and
meaningful, particularly to those of lower English literacy. Otherwise, the texts may
confound the intended meaning of the symbol and be of little to no use to its users.
English Texts Only, Symbols Only or Both
Leib, Dillman, Petrin and Young (2012) analyzed if passengers of various cultural
backgrounds (Chinese and American) would interpret airport terminal signage differently
from its intended meaning when three forms of signage were used: English texts only,
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symbols only or symbols with English texts. The study attempted to investigate which
form of signage was most effective to a culturally diverse audience. Leib et al. (2012)
concluded that both American and Chinese participants not only preferred the symbol-text
combination but also made fewer errors as compared to using symbols only. Passengers of
different cultural backgrounds albeit only two, preferred the symbol-text combination. In
fact, the passengers performed better when the symbol-text combination was used
compared to when the symbols or texts were used in solitary. Following the promising
response to the symbol-text combination, both symbols and accompanied English texts
could be used to display screening information in the hopes of achieving similar positive
outcomes.
Summary of the Relevant Literature
User failure was first examined in greater detail, underlining how passengers
contribute to long passenger lines. Following user failure, concerns brought about by the
hassle factor, the threat of driverless vehicles and the TSA’s security budget were
examined. Subsequently, the rest of the literature review revealed an eclectic mix of
studies that proposed solutions to improve the screening process or airport security as a
whole.
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Chapter III
Methodology
The Modified Boarding Pass
As the proposed security signage should be both easily accessible and visible, the
present study proposes the use of a modified boarding pass with printed screening
instructions on its underside (Figure 7 and Appendix B3). These printed screening
instructions consist of symbols and accompanied English texts that represent interference
items as well as other basic screening instructions. The idea of using a combination of
symbols, pictures, and texts is similar to that of safety briefing cards where pictorially
depicted instructions are used to enhance comprehension, and provide better conveyance
of information (Corbett, McLean, & Cosper, 2008). Owing to the benefits of the picture
superiority effect and dual-coding theory where there are known benefits of better recall
and attention stimulation, symbols were used to pictorially illustrate interference items.
English texts were also used to accompany the symbols because they can guide
interpretation.
Configuring to each airport. Airports occasionally vary about what constitutes
an interference item. For example, some airports do not require passengers to remove
their shoes during security screening (Popken, 2013). To mitigate any confusion, the
modified boarding pass would allow airports and airlines to configure printed instructions
to reflect their respective screening procedures. This configuration ensures that passengers
receiving their boarding pass in a one airport will be provided with screening instructions
that accurately reflects the screening procedures of that particular airport.
Configuring to each passenger. The sample modified boarding pass in Figure 7
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applies primarily to the large majority of the traveling public, not particularly to groups
such as TSA PreCheck, passengers over 75 years old, or those traveling with children.
However, airlines may configure and print screening instructions specifically tailored to
each individual passenger. For instance, passengers under TSA PreCheck will receive
boarding passes notifying them that they do not need to remove their shoes, laptops, and
liquids from their carry-on bags (Song & Zhuang, 2018). This possibility could minimize
the likelihood of TSA PreCheck passengers unknowingly removing their shoes, laptops or
liquids and thus, ensuring that such passengers are processed more quickly. Figure 8 is an
example of the modified boarding pass designed for TSA PreCheck passengers.
By allowing these passengers to correctly prepare for screening beforehand, there
is less need to seek guidance from security personnel. Fewer and shorter interactions with
security personnel may reduce the average time spent screening each passenger. It should
be noted that this aspect of the modified boarding pass will not be analyzed nor tested in
the scope of the present study.
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Figure 7. Sample modified boarding pass.

43

Figure 8. Sample modified boarding pass for TSA PreCheck passengers.
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Figure 9. Sample regular, non-modified boarding pass

Research Approach
This study is a two-part examination into the effects and feasibility of using the
modified boarding pass to provide screening information to passengers. Research study 1
focuses on the ability to recall interference items when three types of stimuli are presented
to participants in a simulated environment. Research study 2 captures passenger responses
at a domestic airport, pertaining to their receptiveness toward the modified boarding pass.
Study 1 (Recall Evaluation)
Study 1 analyzed whether there were differences in the ability to recall 10
interference items when three types of stimuli were used to provide screening information
to participants. The results from this study will provide insight into the differences that
exist between different types of security signage, particularly how well-informed
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passengers are of screening information. Three sets of participants underwent a recall
evaluation after being exposed to their respective stimuli. The researcher manipulated the
stimuli to create the three scenarios and test the effects on participant recall. The range of
interference items on each stimulus remained the same to ensure consistency.


Group 1 served as the experimental control. Participants were provided
regular, non-modified boarding passes and two standing signposts



Group 2 was provided with modified boarding passes only



Group 3 was provided with both modified boarding passes and two standing
signposts

The dependent variable (DV) for this experiment was the number of interference
items recalled by participants in each group in response to the question “List the items that
passengers are required to be remove prior to security screening from their person and
their carry-on bags (TSA Pre-Check is excluded).” The independent variables (IV) for this
experiment were the three types of stimuli mentioned above.
Hypotheses.
H01: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between Group 1 and Group 2.
H02: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between Group 3 and Group 1.
H03: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between Group 3 and Group 2.
Sample. A total of 48 participants were recruited for this study – 16 participants
for each group. The criteria for participation included participants that are at least 18 years
old and enrolled at ERAU. Convenience sampling was employed and participation was
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voluntary; each participant had received an email with an invitation to participate in a simulated security screening exercise. Interested participants contacted the researcher to
schedule an available date for participation.
Design and Procedures. Study 1 was a between-subjects design that comprised of
three different scenarios where participants were asked to recall as many of the 10
interference items that were presented on their respective stimuli. The groups were
exposed to either (a) non-modified boarding pass with two standing signposts, (b) the
modified boarding pass only, or (c) both the modified boarding pass and two standing
signposts. A post-study survey was handed out to the participants upon the completion of
the recall evaluation.
The participants in each group gathered at a conference room at a hallway in one of
the university buildings. Each group had a separate, dedicated meeting date and time.
Upon the researcher’s arrival, participants were given a consent form to acknowledge and
confirm their participation in the study. Afterward, the researcher gave a short briefing
about the study. Here, participants were told again that they would be participating in a
simulated security screening exercise.
The boarding passes were handed out in the conference room. Participants in
Group 1 were given individualized, non-modified boarding passes that resembled
regular boarding passes whereas participants in Groups 2 and 3 were given individual
modified boarding passes. All three groups were instructed to keep their boarding passes
with them until they entered the test room where they returned it to the researcher.
Instructions. Participants were informed that the corridor along the lounge area
was part of the study and that the test room was located at the end of the corridor. In the
conference room, participants were told that once the briefing was over, they would line up
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along the corridor before being allowed into the test room. Participants spent 2 minutes
lining up outside the test room. Afterward, they would be allowed into the room one at a
time, with 10 second intervals between each participant. For Groups 1 and 3, the
researcher pointed out the two standing signposts outside the test room. After being
allowed into the test room, participants returned their boarding passes and were issued a
test paper instructing them to recall the items displayed on their respective stimuli. At the
end of the evaluation, participants were given a post-study survey and were allowed to
leave upon completion of the survey. An important aspect of this study was the
employment of deception. Effort was made to stimulate mundane realism by notifying
participants that they would be participating in a simulated screening exercise, having to
bring along a bag for simulated screening, and they were provided individualized boarding
passes. There was no mention of a recall evaluation taking place in the test room during
the briefing. An explanation to reveal the reason for the recall evaluation instead of a
simulated screening exercise was not provided at the time of the study. The researcher
emailed all the participants to inform them of the deception and reveal the true purpose of
the study once all the data had been collected.
Materials. The study required the use of an informed consent form, two standing
signposts, two different sets of boarding passes, a test paper, and a post evaluation survey.
Informed consent form. The informed consent form explained to the participants
the conditions of the study such as the expected time required for the evaluation,
reminding participants that they were not obligated to complete the evaluation, and that
they could abandon the experiment at any time, without any repercussions. The consent
form can be found in Appendix A.
Standing signposts. The two standing signposts were meant to mimic those

48
typically employed by the TSA, to remind passengers to remove interference items while
they stood in line at security checkpoints. The two standing signposts were evenly
separated along the corridor of the test room. The sample standing signpost can be found
in Appendix B1.
Group 1 boarding pass. The regular, non-modified boarding pass contained the
names of each participant as well as other made-up flight information. The underside
of the boarding pass was intentionally left blank to replicate a regular boarding pass. The
Group 1 boarding pass can be found in Figure 9 and Appendix B2.
Group 2 and 3 modified boarding passes. The modified boarding pass contained
the names of each participant, other made-up flight details, and had screening information
printed on the underside. The screening information was the same as seen on the standing
signposts outside the classroom. The modified boarding pass can be found in Figure 7 and
Appendix B3.
Test paper. The question on all three test papers were the same, “List the items
that passengers are required to remove prior to security screening from your person and
their carry-on bags (TSA Pre-Check is excluded). However, there were different hints for
each group as different stimuli were used. For example, the hint on the test paper for
Group 1 included the sentence, “The items were listed on the standing signposts outside
the classroom”. The other two groups had similar hints according to their provided
stimuli. The three test papers are found in Appendix C.
Post-evaluation survey. The post-evaluation survey contained a short demographic
questionnaire where participants were asked to note their gender, ethnicity, and age. The
researcher used this information to define the population sample. The survey also
contained various questions regarding the perceived effectiveness of their respective
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stimuli. The surveys for Groups 1 and 2 contained a total of five questions: four were yes
or no questions, and one was on a scale. The survey for Group 3 had a total of 11
questions: eight were yes or no questions, and the remaining three were on a scale. The
three surveys are found in Appendix D.
Data Collection. The data for the recall evaluation were collected via a pen and
test paper. Afterward, the data was entered into SPSS for analysis. The data for the
post-evaluation survey were collected via a pen and paper survey, and entered into
Microsoft Excel for analysis.
Study 2 (Airport Survey)
Study 2 involved gathering passenger responses and opinions at Daytona
International Airport (DAB) when presented with the modified boarding pass (Figure 7).
A survey with eight questions: seven scale item questions on a scale, and one open-ended
question was used. A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix F.
Sample. The researcher gathered a sample of 150 respondents. The sample
comprised of respondents that were recruited by means of convenience sampling at DAB.
The researcher obtained IRB approval as well as approval from the DAB authority to
conduct the survey and to approach passengers in the following designated areas:
(a) Baggage claim lobby, (b) Rental car counters, (c) Ticket lobby, (d) Entry lobby,
(e) Small café at level 2, and the (f) Grand lobby. It was requested by the airport that the
researcher set-up a workstation —with a school emblem —to clearly identify that the
survey was part of an official Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) research
study. Over the course of two days, the researcher obtained the 150 responses needed.
The criteria for participation include respondents will be at least 18 years old and
have flown within the U.S at least once in the last six months. The demographic data
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collected included age, gender, and the airline flown the most often by the passenger.
Design and procedures. The researcher approached passengers within the
designated areas to request their participation in the survey. The researcher handed out the
survey and instructed the passengers to answer the first four questions and to let him know
when they were done. Afterward, the passengers were shown a sample of the modified
boarding pass to review and help them answer Questions 5 and 6 which directly pertain to
the modified boarding pass. Upon completing the survey, the researcher placed each
survey into a sealed opaque box to ensure confidentiality and anonymity.
Materials. An informed consent form, paper survey, and five sample modified
boarding passes were used for this study.
Informed consent form. Each respondent was given an informed consent form to
review and to pen their acknowledgement before commencing with the survey. The
consent form explained the purpose of the survey, the expected time required for the
evaluation, and reminded respondents that they were not obligated to complete the survey,
and could abandon it at any time, without any repercussions. A copy of the consent form
can be found in Appendix E.
Survey. The survey contained a short demographic section where respondents
were asked to note their age and gender. The researcher used this information to define
the population sample. Clipboards and pens were provided. The survey can be found in
Appendix F.
Modified boarding pass. The sample modified boarding pass contained made-up
flight details, and had printed screening information on its underside. A total of five
samples were printed and used for the survey. A copy of the modified boarding pass is
found in Figure 7 and Appendix B3.
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Data Collection. The data was collected via a pen and paper survey. Following
the data collection, the data was entered into Microsoft Excel for analysis.
Instrument validity and reliability. The survey questions were specifically
designed to elicit responses that would reveal passenger sentiment toward their
experiences with airport security and their receptiveness toward the modified boarding
pass. The questions were carefully worded and reviewed, undergoing several iterations by
experts in the field. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated as a measure of reliability.
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Chapter IV
Results

Study 1 (Recall Evaluation)
A total of 48 participants from ERAU participated in the recall evaluation and
were split into three groups of 16 participants each. There were 10 females and 38 males.
The average age was 26 and the range was from 20 to 51.
Sample. Participants were asked to provide basic demographic information to
define the sample. The three demographic questions were: age, gender, and ethnicity.
Additionally, participants were not obligated to answer the demographic section.
Although all 48 participants provided their age and gender, only three did not reveal their
ethnicity. The demographic data are summarized in the figure below.

Ethnicity
Middle Eastern
African American
Undisclosed
Hispanic
White
Asian
0

Ethnicity

2

4

6

8

10

12

Asian

White

Hispanic

Undisclosed

19

16

5

4

Ethnicity

Figure 10. Ethnicity breakdown

14

16

African
American
3

18
Middle
Eastern
1

20
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The Asian and White population made up the majority of the sample whereas the
rest included Middle Eastern, African American, Hispanic, and those that did not disclose
their ethnicity.
Recall evaluation. Each group of participants were provided one of three stimuli
to help them recall as many of the 10 interference items as possible. The lowest score
possible was 0 and the highest was 10. The results of each group are summarized below
in the Table 3.

Table 3
Recall evaluation results

Group
1
Group
2
Group
3

Valid
16

Mean
4.06

Median
4

Mode
4

SD
2.32

Min
0

Max
8

16

4.38

4.5

4

2.39

0

8

16

6.44

6

6

1.50

4

9

One-way between-subjects ANOVA. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA
was conducted to compare the mean of the recalled items between the three groups. The
results showed that the one-way between-subjects ANOVA was significant, F(2, 45)
= 5.977, p = .005, η2 = 0.21. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was not
significant (p = .353). The post-hoc test, Tukey HSD, indicated that the mean for Group
3 (M = 6.44, SD = 1.50) was significantly better than Group 1 (M = 4.06, SD = 2.32) and
Group 2 (M = 4.38, SD = 2.39). However, there were no significant post hoc tests
between Groups 1 and 2.
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Hypotheses testing. As per the results, H1 was retained whereas H2 and H3
were rejected.
H01: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between Group 1 (regular, non-modified boarding pass and two standing signposts) and
Group 2 (modified boarding pass only).
H02: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between Group 3 (modified boarding pass and two standing signposts) and Group 1
(regular, non-modified boarding pass).
H03: There will be no significant difference in recalling interference items
between Group 3 (modified boarding pass and two standing signposts) and Group 2
(modified boarding pass only).
Group 1 survey results. There was a total of five questions, four of which were
yes or no questions, and one question that was measured against a scale ranging from 1 to
5, where 1 represented the lowest score (Not useful) and 5 represented the highest (Very
useful). The results from each of the five questions are provided below.

Table 4
Group 1 Question 1
Did you notice the TSA signage post outside the test room?
Yes
No
16
0
Note. For this question, if participants noted no, they would skip to question 5. Since all
16 participants answered yes, none of them left questions 2, 3 and 4 unanswered.
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Table 5
Group 1 Question 2
Did you read the contents of the TSA signage post?
Yes
No
10
6

Table 6
Group 1 Question 3
Did you have sufficient time to read the contents?
Yes
No
12
4

Table 7
Group 1 Question 4
Was the TSA signage post helpful in recalling the items to remove before
security screening?
Yes
No
10
6

Table 8
Group 1 Question 5
In your opinion, how useful are TSA signposts at airports during security
screening?
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
16

3.38

1.20

Note. This question was measured on a scale (1-5). The lowest score gathered was 1, and
the highest was 5.
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Group 2 survey results. There was a total of five questions in this survey, four
of which were yes or no questions, and one that was measured against a scale similar to
that used in Group 1. The results are provided below.

Table 9
Group 2 Question 1
Did you notice the TSA information on the underside of the boarding pass?
Yes
No
11
5
Note. For this question, if participants noted no, they would skip to question 5. Since all 5
participants answered no, there will be only 11 responses to questions 2, 3 and 4.

Table 10
Group 2 Question 2
Did you read the contents on the underside of the boarding pass?
Yes
No
Invalid
6
5
5

Table 11
Group 2 Question 3
Did you have sufficient time to read the contents?
Yes
No
Invalid
9
2
5
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Table 12
Group 2 Question 4
Was the underside of the boarding pass helpful in recalling the items to remove
before security screening?
Yes
No
Invalid
9
2
5

Table 13
Group 2 Question 5
In your opinion, how useful can the boarding pass you received, be during
security screening if used at airports?
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
16

3.31

1.19

Note. This question was measured on a scale (1-5). The lowest score gathered was 1, and
the highest was 5.

Group 3 survey results. There was a total of 11 questions in the survey, eight of
which were yes or no questions, and three of them were measured against a scale used in
Groups 1 and 2. The results are provided below.

Table 14
Group 3 Question 1
Did you notice the information on the TSA signage posts?
Yes
No
15
1
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Table 15
Group 3 Question 2
Did you notice the information on the underside of the boarding pass?
Yes
No
14
2

Table 16
Group 3 Question 3
Did you read the contents of the TSA signage posts?
Yes
No
10
6

Table 17
Group 3 Question 4
Did you read the contents on the underside of the boarding pass?
Yes
No
11
5

Table 18
Group 3 Question 5
Did you have sufficient time to read the contents of the TSA signage posts?
Yes
No
15
1
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Table 19
Group 3 Question 6
Did you have sufficient time to read the contents on the underside of the
boarding pass?
Yes
No
16
0

Table 20
Group 3 Question 7
Was the TSA signage posts helpful in recalling the items to remove before
security screening?
Yes
No
11
5

Table 21
Group 3 Question 8
Was the underside of the boarding pass helpful in recalling the items to remove
before security screening?
Yes
No
13
3

Table 22
Group 3 Question 9
In your opinion, how useful are TSA signposts at airports during security
screening?
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
16

3.75

1.29

Note. This question was measured on a scale (1-5). The lowest score gathered was 1, and
the highest was 5.
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Table 23
Group 3 Question 10
In your opinion, how useful can the boarding pass you received, be during
security screening if used at airports?
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
16

4.06

1.18

Note. This question was measured on a scale (1-5). The lowest score gathered was 1, and
the highest was 5.

Table 24
Group 3 Question 11
In your opinion, how useful would the use of both TSA signposts and the
boarding pass you received, be during security screening if used at airports?
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
16

4.44

0.81

Note. This question was measured on a scale (1-5). The lowest score gathered was 2, and
the highest was 5.

Cross-comparing results. As certain questions were repeated, some results
across the three surveys can be compared with each other to measure consistency. Group
1 question 5 and Group 3 question 9 both measured the perceived usefulness of the
standing signposts. Group 2 question 5 can be compared against Group 3 question 10
which measured the perceived usefulness of the modified boarding pass. A combined
average was calculated to determine the general consensus among the participants
involved. The results are as follows.
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Table 25
In Your Opinion, How Useful Are TSA Signposts at Airports During Security Screening?

Group 1
Group 3
Combined

Valid
16
16
16

Mean
3.39
3.75
3.57

Std. Deviation
1.20
1.29
1.24

Table 26
In Your Opinion, How Useful Can The Boarding Pass You Received, Be During Security
Screening If Used at Airports?

Group 2
Group 3
Combined

Valid
16
16
16

Mean
3.31
4.06
3.69

Std. Deviation
1.19
1.18
1.23

Consistency. In Table 25, the results from Groups 1 (M = 3.39, SD = 1.20) and 3
(M = 3.75, SD = 1.29) are relatively consistent as the mean does not vary substantially.
However, as seen in Table 26, the results from Groups 2 (M = 3.31, SD = 1.19) and 3
(M = 4.06, SD = 1.18) do vary quite a bit. The perceived usefulness of the standing
signposts is considered consistent whereas the perceived usefulness of the modified
boarding pass is relatively inconsistent. The combined averages for both the standing
signposts only and the modified boarding pass only questions were calculated for easier
analysis.
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Study 2 (Airport Survey)
A total of 150 passengers responded to the airport survey conducted at DAB.
There was a fairly equal representation of gender with 73 females and 77 males. The
average age is 50, and the range was from 19 to 81. Additionally, the respondents
answered all the questions. Cronbach’s alpha for the survey questions was .52. There
were a total of 160 responses to question 7 as some respondents noted down more than
one answer. As the only non-scale question, the results of question 7 will be discussed
first.
Question 7. Participants were asked to note the airline that they flew with the
most often. With a 62.5% share, the majority indicated that they flew with Delta the
most often. The next highest was American with 23.8%, followed by Southwest (7.5%),
United (3.8%), and Others (Air France, Allegiant, Alaska, and JetBlue) with 2.5%. The
breakdown is summarized as a pie chart and can be found in Figure 11.

Airline %

American
Delta
Others
Southwest
United

Figure 11. Airline flown the most often.
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Descriptive Statistics
A scale ranging from 1 to 10 was used for the survey with 1 representing the
lowest score (e.g., Never, Not At All) and 10 being the highest score possible
(e.g., Always, Definitely). The mean score of each question was calculated to gain a
preliminary understanding of the respondents’ answers. Table 27 summarizes the results
from the survey, while Table 28 contains a detailed breakdown (number and percentage
of the sample) of each score, for each question. The researcher omitted Question 8 from
this analysis because the question was requested by DAB for their own in-house
assessment and does not pertain directly to the objectives of this paper.

Table 27
Descriptive Statistics for Airport Survey

Qn 1
Qn 2
Qn 3
Qn 4
Qn 5
Qn 6

Valid Missing Mean Median Mode
150
0
8.67
10
10
150
0
6.09
7
8
150
0
3.64
3
2
150
0
6.47
7
10
150
0
8.60
10
10
150
0
8.43
9
10

SD
2.13
2.79
2.49
3.06
2.10
2.07

Min
1
2
1
1
1
1

Max
10
10
10
10
10
10
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Table 28
Detailed Scoring for Airport Survey
Scores

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

n

Qn 1

4

3

0

2

3

6

11

15

26

80

150

2.7%

2%

0%

1.3%

2%

4%

7.3%

10%

17.3%

53.3%

100%

12

9

12

12

18

8

19

29

13

18

150

8%

6%

8%

8%

12%

5.3%

12.7%

19.3%

8.7%

12%

100%

30

40

21

13

9

7

13

12

3

2

150

20%

26.7%

14%

8.7%

6%

4.7%

8.7%

8%

2%

1.3%

100%

16

5

11
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Figure 12. Are you aware of all the personal possessions that are needed to be removed
in preparation for TSA screening?
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Figure 13. At times, are you frustrated by other passengers who did not know of all the
items to remove for screening?
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Figure 14. Have you forgotten to remove an item during screening that you know you
should have removed?
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Figure 15. Do you believe security screening should be made more convenient for
passengers?
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Figure 16. TSA screening protocol can differ between airports. This sample boarding
pass can help notify you of these changes. Would this information on the sample
boarding pass be useful to you in preparing for screening?
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Figure 17. Do you think the sample boarding pass can be more useful for passengers
compared to current TSA methods (such as signposts and announcements).
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussions for Study 1
Recall evaluation. The purpose of Study 1 was to determine if there were
differences in the ability to correctly recall the 10 interference items that were displayed
on the three types of stimuli used.
1. Regular, non-modified boarding pass and two standing signposts only
(Group 1)
2. Modified boarding pass only (Group 2)
3. Modified boarding pass and two standing signposts (Group 3)
Comparing TSA signposts only and modified boarding pass only. The results
showed that there were no significant differences in the number of interference items
recalled between these groups. Interestingly, the modified boarding pass did not help
participants better remember the 10 items when presented alone. Participants in Group 1
did nearly as well as Group 2 despite having less exposure time to their stimuli (standing
signposts). There could be four reasons for this result. First, five participants in Group 2
did not realize that there were screening instructions on the back of the modified boarding
pass despite being informed in the pre-study briefing. A plausible explanation could be
that participants missed out on this particular instruction during the briefing. Another
five participants did not read the contents on the underside of the boarding pass although
they knew that it contained screening information.
In comparison, all 16 participants in Group 1 noticed the standing signposts, and
only six did not read it. Overall, 10 out of 16 participants in Group 2 did not read the
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underside of their boarding passes. Significantly, 25% more participants in Group 2
underwent the recall evaluation with no knowledge of the 10 interference items and
would have likely guessed their answers, perhaps explaining why they did not do much
better than Group 1.
Second, in Group 2, several participants were engaged in conversation throughout
the course of the study, particularly when standing in line outside the test room. These
individuals were probably distracted and less likely to focus on the modified boarding
pass, or the standing signposts while in line. This observation may explain why many
participants in Group 2 did not read or refer to their modified boarding pass during the
study.
Third, there was a difference in exposure time to the respective stimuli.
Participants in Group 2 were given the modified boarding pass in the conference room
several minutes before lining up outside the test room. Although the participants had
more time with the modified boarding pass, they did not necessarily refer to it again
outside of the conference room. A longer time would have elapsed between their
exposure to the modified boarding pass and the recall evaluation, where they may have
then forgotten some of the items. Participants in Group 1 had a shorter time (roughly two
minutes) between their exposure to the standing signposts and their recall evaluation.
Their memory of the interference items may have been more recent and fresher, perhaps
slightly offsetting the limited time they had to review the standing signposts outside the
test room.
Finally, the design of the study may have deflated the potential effects of the
modified boarding pass in Group 2. Unlike being in an airport environment where
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passengers refer to their boarding passes multiple times for information such as gate
numbers, participants in this study did not need to use or refer to their modified boarding
passes after receiving it in the conference room. Instead, they were led directly to the test
room. If participants were afforded more time, more of them may have noticed the
information on the back of the modified boarding pass and the results may have been
different.
Comparing standing signposts only with standing signposts and modified
boarding pass. There was a significant difference between the combination of the
standing signposts and the modified boarding pass group and the standing signposts only
group.
Comparing modified boarding pass only with standing signposts and modified
boarding pass. There was a significant difference between the combination of the
standing signposts and the modified boarding pass group and the modified boarding pass
only group.
The natural conclusion points to an increase in participant recall when the two
types of stimuli were used together. Six participants in Group 1 and six in Group 3
reported that they did not read the standing signposts, whereas 10 participants in Group 2
and five in Group 3 did not read the underside of the modified boarding pass. Group 3
did significantly better than Groups 1 and 2 despite an almost equal number of
participants not reviewing their respective stimuli. In Group 3, although participants may
not have read the standing signposts, they may have read the modified boarding pass
instead and vice versa. This observation would align well with the theory of selective
attention where individuals tend to only focus on one particular source of attention. With
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more stimuli present, it would have also been less likely that the participants did not see
the 10 interference items at all. Participants in Groups 1 and 2 may have not seen any of
the 10 items as they had overlooked their respective stimuli, perhaps explaining their
relatively low scores on the recall evaluation.
Post-evaluation survey. The purpose of the post-evaluation survey was to
ascertain participant opinion on the respective stimuli that they were provided.
The survey asked participants how useful they would find their respective stimuli if it
were used during security screening at airports. As mentioned in the results, certain
questions were repeated and were subsequently compared against each other to measure
consistency. The combined averages for the standing signposts only and modified boarding pass only, were calculated. The results found that the standing signposts scored the
lowest on perceived usefulness during security screening.
Although participants found the modified boarding pass to be slightly more useful
than the standing signposts, the difference was marginal at best. The difference in mean
score was only 0.12. It is rational to conclude that when used alone, participants
generally feel that the modified boarding pass and the standing signposts were somewhat,
equally useful. There was evidence of inconsistency between the groups that measured
the perceived usefulness of the modified boarding pass. Out of the three types of stimuli,
the combination of the modified boarding pass and the TSA signposts was perceived to
be most useful, if implemented at airports.
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Discussions for Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to assess passenger receptiveness toward the idea of
using the modified boarding pass as an alternative, supplementary form of security
signage to help them better prepare for security screening. An overall positive response
would indicate if the modified boarding pass was perceived to be useful, and if
passengers would use it if it became an option to them in the future. Answers to the other
questions would also provide additional insight into passenger sentiment toward the
current security screening experience and perhaps, reveal other passenger-related
concerns.
Question 1 (M = 8.67, SD = 2.13). Approximately 80.6% of the respondents
scored 8 and above on the scale, suggesting that a large majority were confidently aware
of the personal possessions that had to be removed prior to screening (hereafter referred
to as removal of interference items).
Sampling limitation. The result points to a sampling limitation that may be a
direct result of the researcher employing convenience sampling. It is not possible to be
certain of the diversity and demographic make-up of the passengers surveyed. With an
overwhelming majority of passengers scoring highly for Question 1, it is assumed that the
majority of the passengers could have been either American travelers or frequent fliers,
owing to their strong familiarity with screening procedures.
With the large majority scoring highly for Question 1, it is also possible that an
element of social desirability bias may have been present. Social desirability bias is a
form of socially motivated misreporting where individuals tend to inflate their responses
to impress and try to cultivate a positive self-image to others (Krumpal, 2013). It would
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have been possible that the respondents may have over-estimated their knowledge of
screening procedures to avoid humiliation or embarrassment in front of the researcher,
given that there was also no way to validate the accuracy of their response.
Question 2 (M = 6.09, SD = 2.79). Over half of the respondents (58%)
indicated that they were occasionally frustrated by other passengers who were unfamiliar
with interference items that needed to be removed during security screening. The rest
(42%) were either more tolerant or were not bothered by other passengers and their
unfamiliarity with screening procedures. The group that was more tolerant and not
bothered by other passengers could have been affected by social desirability as well, one
involving ethical behavior. This aspect of social desirability bias involves the perception
of ethical behavior where an individual may inflate or deflate a response to a desirable or
undesirable action or feeling (Chung & Monroe, 2003).
The respondents may have deflated their response to be perceived as less
judgmental by downplaying their level of frustration with others who take a longer time
to undergo screening. Respondents who scored low tended to hesitate (perhaps
re-evaluating their initially harsh response), while respondents that scored high were
more likely to try and verbally justify giving higher scores (perhaps to rationalize for
their more judgmental opinion). The researcher finds that both actions corresponded with
the explanation of social desirability bias by Chung and Monroe (2003) where it was
evident that individuals were inclined to appear more socially and ethically acceptable in
front of others.
Question 3 (M = 3.64, SD = 2.49). Approximately 75% of respondents rarely
forgot to remove an item during security screening that they knew they should have
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removed (hereafter referred to as failure to remove an interference item). The remaining
respondents occasionally failed to remove an interference item(s) during security
screening. The results from Question 3 coincide and support Question 1 where the
majority of travelers claimed to be confidently aware of interference items that have to be
removed during security screening. A large majority of travelers indicated in Question 3
that they rarely failed to remove an interference item during security screening.
Although the results of Questions 1 and 3 are promising —passengers more aware
of interference items are less likely to fail to remove them during screening— it would
not be appropriate to assert that the greater population is indeed proficient and fully
aware of screening procedures. The reason is partly because the researcher cannot be
certain that non-American travelers and non-frequent fliers were sufficiently represented
in the sample. User failure should not be discounted without obtaining a more
representative sample, particularly one that confidently exhibits equal representation of
non-Americans travelers and non-frequent fliers.
Question 4 (M = 6.47, SD = 3.06). Slightly more than a third (35.3%) of
respondents were strong believers that security screening should be made more
convenient. About a fifth (21.3%) of respondents were relatively satisfied with the
current state of security screening, and do not believe that it should be made more
convenient. The remaining respondents (43.4%) had a more neutral stance or were
undecided. Many respondents attributed their neutrality to their lack of traveling through
major airports. Most of them indicated that because they frequently traveled through
DAB —a small regional airport that almost never encounters long security lines or
congestion— they could not meaningfully answer the question based on experience.

75
Many passengers were conflicted when answering this question as many felt that
more convenient security screening would directly correspond to more lenient security
standards. At the same time, however, many of them were concerned with the prospect
of security lines getting increasingly longer, and air travel becoming more inconvenient.
As a result, a large number of passengers took up a more neutral position on the question.
Question 5 (M = 8.60, SD = 2.10). About 79% of respondents strongly felt that
the modified boarding pass would enable them to better prepare for security screening,
considering that airports often have differing screening procedures and guidelines. The
researcher also recalled that numerous respondents were confused by different screening
standards between domestic airports.
An example frequently brought up, was the removal of shoes for security
screening in one local airport, but not having to do so in another. Respondents disclosed
that they took off their shoes anyway, regardless of whether they were not required to.
Despite requiring more time to remove their shoes and having to put them back on again,
respondents felt that doing so was easier than figuring out the airport’s stance on shoe
removal, let alone being called back by TSA officers for not removing their shoes.
When passengers feel and act this way, airports are unlikely to observe the time-saving
benefits of allowing passengers to keep their shoes on to expedite screening.
Question 6 (M = 8.43, SD = 2.07). Approximately 72% of respondents strongly
felt the modified boarding pass would be more useful at providing screening information
than current TSA methods (e.g., signposts and security announcements). Respondents
offered the researcher additional insight into several shortcomings with security signposts
and announcements. Rather unsurprisingly, numerous respondents mentioned that they
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struggled to read the signposts without obstructing the movement of other passengers in
security lines, often choosing to sacrifice reading the signposts than to interfere with the
movement of people, particularly during peak periods. Others admitted to not paying
attention to security announcements, partly because they were engaged in other activities
(e.g., listening to music, using their mobile phones, engaged in conversation) or that they
simply could not hear the announcements clearly due to the background noise from the
vast number of people in line.
Conclusions for Study 1
Underwhelming effect of the modified boarding pass. The results of the
recall evaluation suggested that the modified boarding pass was not significantly better
than the standing signposts at stimulating recall. However, the utilization rate of the
modified boarding pass was rather underwhelming. More than half of the participants did
not use the modified boarding pass to answer the recall evaluation. It would not be
appropriate to conclude that the modified boarding pass is not better than standing
signposts in stimulating recall.
Sampling limitation. Participants particularly in Groups 2, were engaged in conversation throughout the study. This observation was interpreted as the reason for more
participants not noticing or reviewing their stimuli. Naturally, these individuals were less
likely to recall as many of the 10 items. This outcome may be attributed to the use of
convenience sampling, where participants were found to have been classmates or friends,
and offered to participate together on the same day. This factor could present itself as a
confounding variable to the saliency of both the modified boarding pass, the two standing
signposts, as well as the number of items recalled.
More stimuli, better recall. When both the standing signposts and the modified
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boarding pass were used, participants were significantly better at recalling the 10 items.
Using the standing signposts and the modified boarding pass together, could potentially
help passengers better remember pertinent items that are to be removed prior to security
screening. The result could also mean that fewer passengers are flagged for leaving
interference items on their person, or in their carry-on bags during screening. Fewer
passengers would have to backtrack or undergo secondary bag inspections.
Conclusions for Study 2
Higher awareness, fewer mistakes. The results from Questions 1 and 3 show
signs of promise where passengers that are more aware of interference items are less
likely to make user-failure related mistakes such as forgetting, or failing to remove
interference items from their person or carry-on. The result also implies that a
better-informed passenger is more prepared for security screening and is less likely to
make mistakes, or create time-consuming stoppages at screening checkpoints.
Not to overlook user failure yet. Owing to the high levels of awareness (of
interference items) and few mistakes made during screening (forgetting interference
items), the researcher concludes that the majority of respondents are likely to be
American travelers and/or frequent fliers. Although the results suggest that user failure is
not as prevalent, it cannot be certain that user failure does not exist. A subsequent study
could include provisions to ensure that the sample is not only more diverse but provides
a greater representation of non-American and non-frequent travelers.
Shortcomings. Other important discoveries from the survey include further
evidence that passengers struggle with screening procedures that differ between
domestic airports. When screening procedures differ, the saliency of security signage is
important in ensuring that passengers are aware of what is expected of them. Otherwise,
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user failure will be increasingly common. The passenger sentiment gathered exposes
several shortcomings of current security signage, as put forth by the researcher.
Some of the assumptions and observations made in the study prior to the survey were
validated by passenger sentiment and feedback.
Passenger sentiment. The data revealed that roughly 3/4 of all respondents had a
positive impression and attitude toward the modified boarding pass. The majority
understood its purpose and the value it could add to their own future security screening
experience. Passengers were also impressed by the simplicity of the sample modified
boarding pass and their feedback gave the researcher ample confidence that they would
benefit from it.
Recommendations for Study 1
Instruction to participants. A common theme among the three experimental
groups was that roughly a third of the participants did not review their respective stimuli,
regardless of which group they were in. Results of the recall evaluation would have
possibly been deflated. Hence, a future similar study could be conducted where
instructions to participants are clearer and unambiguous. Such a study could yield greater
differences between the standing signposts only group, and the modified boarding pass
only group.
Random sampling. The recall evaluation results from Group 2 may not
accurately represent the saliency of the modified boarding pass because a considerable
number of participants were busily engaged in conversation instead of paying attention to
their surroundings and their stimuli. The number of items recalled were most likely,
guesses at best. It would be challenging to ascertain the true effects of the modified
boarding pass without a subsequent study comprising of a more diverse and randomized
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sample. A greater attempt at randomization where participants do not know each other
prior to the study, may limit participant interaction, increase attention to the stimuli, and
provide more definitive results.
More exposure time to stimuli. A drawback with the design of the study was an
inadequate amount of exposure time to either of the three stimuli. Many participants in
each of the three groups did not review the contents of their respective stimuli. A
subsequent study could provide participants more time with their stimuli so that they may
properly review it, or at the very least, notice it.
Recommendations for Study 2
Revised sample. The survey was limited in its analysis because the researcher
assumes that the large majority of respondents were American travelers and/or frequent
fliers. The implication is the inability to assess the extent of user failure where the main
passenger profile is primarily international, non-American travelers or non-frequent
fliers. It is recommended that a subsequent survey specifically targeting international,
non-American travelers or non-frequent fliers is conducted to provide essential data about
their level of preparedness for security screening and their frequency of making
user-failure related mistakes. If the findings indicate low levels of preparedness for
security screening, and high frequencies of user-failure related mistakes, there would be
compelling evidence that user failure exists.
Security signage. Passenger feedback from the survey was particularly insightful
and constructive to the researcher. Their feedback validated the saliency shortcomings of
TSA signposts, mentioned in the paper. It is recommended that there is prompt revision
and re-examination into the saliency of current security signage. Other alternative
stimulus such as the modified boarding pass, or other creative solutions could be
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considered, with the main objective of better-informing, and better-preparing passengers
for security screening.
In an effort to maximize the effectiveness of the modified boarding pass, an
improvement that can be considered would be to include a Uniform Resource Locator
(URL) or QR code (sort of matrix barcode), that allows passengers to be effortlessly
directed to a TSA website, or one with useful security screening information, using their
smartphones. This option would offer passengers access to an even wider range of
security-related information over the internet.
Closing Statement
The present study found that due to some experimental design shortcomings, the
true effects of the modified boarding pass may not have been entirely captured in the
recall evaluation. A subsequent, improved study could address this shortcoming and
gather more definitive results. However, the positive results gathered when the modified
boarding pass was supplemented with security signposts is encouraging. The majority of
the flying public were receptive toward potentially using the modified boarding pass to
prepare for security screening. These findings strongly suggest that the concept of the
modified boarding pass may add value as an alternative or supplementary form of
security signage for passenger screening and hence, consideration could be given toward
a trial or preliminary testing of the idea at an airport. Finally, it is hoped that this paper
serves as a pioneering groundwork for greater recognition and examination into user
failure.
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
An Alternative Method of Providing TSA Screening Information to passengers
Purpose of this Research: I am asking you to take part in a research project for the purpose of ascertaining public sentiment on the use of various informational instruments
when providing TSA screening information to intended audiences. This research may
contribute to the improvement of the airport security experience. During this study, you
will be asked to undergo a simple written evaluation and complete a post-study survey.
The total expected duration of this study is approximately 30 minutes.
Eligibility: To be in this study, you must be 1) 18 years or older and 2) Enrolled at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) Daytona Beach.
Risks or discomforts: The risks of participating in this study are minimal, no more than
what is experienced in everyday life.
Benefits: While I do not expect you to benefit directly or personally from the study, the
results and conclusions derived from your participation will help me investigate if my
proposal can improve certain aspects of the passenger experience pertaining to airport security. This study may eventually provide significant insight into improving airport security in the United States and may one day benefit you as well.
Confidentiality of records: Your individual and personal information will be protected
in all data resulting from this study. Your responses in this study will be confidential. No
personal information will be collected other than basic demographic descriptors. I will be
the only one that will have access to your personal information. To ensure the confidentiality of your responses, I will provide each participant with a unique ID for the study.
Any collected data or personal information will be entered and stored in a password protected file on a password-protected computer or in a locked file cabinet. The data will be
stored for 3 years after any publication, if any, and then will be shredded. Information
collected as part of this research will not be used or distributed for future research studies.
Compensation: There is no compensation offered for taking part in this study.
Contact: If you have any questions or would like additional information about this study,
please contact Joel Lee (386) 284 8481, leej143@my.erau.edu or the faulty member overseeing this project, Dr. Andrew Dattel at (386) 226- 7795, andy.dattel@erau.edu. For any
concerns or questions as a participant in this research, contact the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) at 386-226-7179 or via email teri.gabriel@erau.edu
Voluntary participation: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. Should you wish to discontinue the research at any
time, no information collected will be used.
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Participant Privacy: Any personal information that can identify you will be removed
from the data collected and this data will not be used or distributed for future research
studies.
CONSENT. By signing below, I certify that I am 18 years or older, enrolled at ERAU
Daytona Beach, understand the information on this form and voluntarily agree to participate in the study.
If you do not wish to participate in the study, simply close the browser which will direct
you out of the study.
Please print a copy of this form for your records. A copy of this form can also be requested from Joel, leej143@my.erau.edu
Signature of Participant ___________________________Date: __________________
Printed Name of Participant ___________________________
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Appendix B
Stimuli for Study 1
B1

Sample Standing Signpost Information.

B2

Sample Non-modified Boarding Pass (Front and Back).

B3

Sample Modified Boarding Pass (Front and Back).
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Figure B1. Sample standing signpost
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Intentionally left blank

Figure B2. Sample regular, non-modified boarding pass (front and back).
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Figure B3. Sample modified boarding pass (front and back).
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Appendix C
Test Papers for Study 1
Recall Evaluation C1 (Group 1)
Recall Evaluation C2 (Group 2)
Recall Evaluation C3 (Group 3)

100
Participant Number: _______

Recall Evaluation C1

Please answer the following question:

1. List the items that passengers are required to remove prior to security screening from
their person and their carry-on bags (TSA Pre-Check is excluded)

Note: The items were listed on the standing signposts outside
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Participant Number: _______

Recall Evaluation C2

Please answer the following question:

1. List the items that passengers are required to remove prior to security screening from
their person and their carry-on bags (TSA Pre-Check is excluded)

Note: The items were listed on the underside of your boarding pass
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Participant Number: _______

Recall Evaluation C3

Please answer the following question:

1. List the items that passengers are required to remove prior to security screening from
their person and their carry-on bags (TSA Pre-Check is excluded)

Note: The items were listed on the underside of your boarding pass and on the standing
signposts
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Appendix D
Post-evaluation Surveys for Study 1
Post-evaluation survey D1 (Group 1)
Post-evaluation survey D2 (Group 2)
Post-evaluation survey D3 (Group 3)
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Participant Number: _______

Post-evaluation survey D1
Demographics:
Please answer the following questions:
*You may choose to not answer all the questions in this section
1. What is your age? _____
2. What is your gender? ________
3. What is your ethnicity? _____________

Please answer the following questions (circle the answers)
1. Did you notice the TSA signage post outside the test room? (yes / no)
*If no, skip to question 5.
2. Did you read the contents of the TSA signage post? (yes / no)
3. Did you have sufficient time to read the contents? (yes / no)
4. Was the TSA signage post helpful in recalling the items to remove before security
screening? (yes / no)

5. In your opinion, how useful are TSA signposts at airports during security screening?

1
Not useful

2

3

4

5
Very useful

Thank you for your participation
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Participant Number: _______

Post-evaluation survey D2
Demographics:
Please answer the following questions:
*You may choose to not answer all the questions in this section
1. What is your age? _____
2. What is your gender? ________
3. What is your ethnicity? _____________

Please answer the following questions (circle the answers)
1.

Did you notice the TSA information on the underside of the boarding pass? (yes / no)
*If no, skip to question 5.

2.

Did you read the contents on the underside of the boarding pass? (yes / no)

3.

Did you have sufficient time to read the contents? (yes / no)

4. Was the underside of the boarding pass helpful in recalling the items to remove before security screening? (yes / no)

5. In your opinion, how useful can the boarding pass you received, be during security
screening if used at airports?

1
Not useful

2

3

4

5
Very useful

Thank you for your participation
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Participant Number: _______

Post-evaluation survey D3
Demographics:
Please answer the following questions:
*You may choose to not answer all the questions in this section
1. What is your age? _____
2.

What is your gender? ________

3.

What is your ethnicity? _____________

Please answer the following questions (circle the answers)
1. Did you notice the information on the TSA signage posts? (yes / no)
2. Did you notice the information on the underside of the boarding pass? (yes / no)

3. Did you read the contents of the TSA signage posts? (yes / no)
4. Did you read the contents on the underside of the boarding pass? (yes / no)

5. Did you have sufficient time to read the contents of the TSA signage posts? (yes / no)
6. Did you have sufficient time to read the contents on the underside of the boarding
pass?
(yes / no)

7. Was the TSA signage posts helpful in recalling the items to remove before security
screening? (yes / no)
8. Was the underside of the boarding pass helpful in recalling the items to remove before security screening? (yes / no)

Please flip to the next page
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9. In your opinion, how useful are TSA signposts at airports during security screening?

1
Not useful

2

3

4

5
Very useful

10. In your opinion, how useful can the boarding pass you received, be during security
screening if used at airports?

1
Not useful

2

3

4

5
Very useful

11. In your opinion, how useful would the use of both TSA sign posts and the boarding
pass you received, be during security screening if used at airports?

1
Not useful

2

3

4

5
Very useful

Thank you for your participation
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
An Alternative Method of Providing TSA Screening Information to passengers
You are invited to participate in a research survey conducted by Joel Lee, a graduate student in the
Masters of Science in Aeronautics (MSA) department at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
(ERAU).
Purpose of this Research: I am asking you to take part in a research for the purpose of investigating
the perceived usefulness of the modified boarding pass that will be shown to you. During the survey,
you will be asked several questions pertaining to your opinion toward the modified boarding pass
sample. The expected duration of the survey is approximately 5 minutes.
Benefits: While I do not expect you to benefit directly or personally from the study, the results and
conclusions derived from your participation will help me investigate if my proposal can help passengers better prepare for security screening with the hope of reducing congestion at security checkpoints.
This study may eventually provide significant insight into improving airport security in the United
States and may one day benefit you as well.
Confidentiality of records: The information gathered about you will only be your demographics and
responses to the survey questions. This information will be protected and confidential. I will be the
only one that will have access to your personal information. Any collected data or personal information will be entered and stored in a password protected file on a password-protected computer or in
a locked file cabinet. The data will be stored for 3 years after any publication, if any, and then will be
shredded.
Contact: If you have any questions or would like additional information about this study, please contact Joel Lee (386) 284 8481 or leej143@my.erau.edu. You can also contact the research advisor, Dr.
Andrew Dattel at (386) 226- 7795 or andy.dattel@erau.edu.
The ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB) have
approved this project. You may contact the ERAU IRB with any questions or issues at (386) 226-7179
or teri.gabriel@erau.edu. ERAU’s IRB is registered with the Department of Health & Human Services.
Voluntary participation: Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You may stop or
withdraw from the study at any time or refuse to answer any question that you are uncomfortable answering without penalty.
CONSENT. Your consent means that you understand the information on this form, that any and all
questions you may have about this study have been answered, and you voluntarily agree to participate.
Disclaimer: This survey is not sponsored by Daytona International Airport (DAB) or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). It is strictly for ERAU research purposes only.
If you do not wish to participate in the survey, simply tick the disagree box below or let the researcher
(Joel) know.
Please tick to indicate if you agree or disagree to participate in this study
Agree

Disagree
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Age:

Gender:

Please circle your responses
1. Are you aware of all the personal possessions that are needed to be removed in preparation
for TSA screening?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not
Very
Aware
Aware
At All
2. At times, are you frustrated by other passengers who did not know of all the items to remove
for screening?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Never
All
The Time
3. Have you forgotten to remove an item during screening that you know you should have removed?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Never
Always

4. Do you believe security screening should be made more convenient for passengers?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not
Yes
At All
Definitely
5. TSA screening protocol can differ between airports. This sample boarding pass can help notify you of these changes. Would this information on the sample boarding pass be useful to
you in preparing for screening?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not
Yes
At All
Definitely
6. Do you think the sample boarding pass can be more useful for passengers compared to current TSA methods (such as signposts and announcements)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not
Yes
At All
Definitely
7. Which airline do you fly the most often? ______________ (Please fill in)

